The other security debacle this week was the revelation that the private keys to eight eMudhra intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificates have been compromised. This is on the scale of the 2014 Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL, but without a catchy name.
eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise
Ars Technica: The Internet goes on high alert after discovery of 8 compromised TLS certs
What happened is that eMudhra released 8 intermediate certificates that have trivial private keys. How trivial? The keys are: 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, and 237.
Knowing the private key, anyone can forge a certificate for any site, and sign it with eMudhra’s inane private key. If the chain-of-trust trusts the eMudhra certificate, then your forged certificate is trusted. If you can intercept traffic then you can transparently decrypt HTTPS connections that are for the site you forged.
The certificates have been added to revocation lists, so if you’re using a major browser (Chrome, Firefox, etc.) then you’re OK. The linked eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise site will test this for you. Even Safari on macOS Ventura is OK, because, I think, applications using macOS TLS services have the revocation checked by macOS.
The problem is the all the places that have their own trusted certificate store, that are not easily updated. One example is curl on macOS – it depends on /etc/ssl/cert.pem, which likely won’t be updated until the next macOS point release. There’s also IoT devices (the o stands for Security), unmaintained CLI tools, containers, servers accidentally sealed up by drywall and forgotten. This is why it will take years to cleanup, hence the comparison to Heartbleed.
Right now, you can visit the linked site with your favorite web browser. Look at the Does your client still trust the compromised intermediates? section. If the result is all green “
Did not connect”, you’re good for that browser. The site also give instructions for testing command line utilities such as curl.